Yemen’s civil war has ceased to be a contained regional crisis, with escalating Houthi attacks around the Bab al-Mandeb strait in 2024–2025 and into this year disrupting global shipping, navigation and the strategic calculations of major powers. The Houthis’ Iranian-backed capacity to threaten one of the world’s most important maritime corridors is described not as an isolated military development but as the product of collapsed Yemeni state institutions, weakening international support for the internationally recognised government, armed faction proliferation and competing regional agendas.
Key Takeaways: The Houthi threat is assessed as more durable than that once posed by ISIS or al-Qaeda because it combines territorial control, inherited state and military capacity, and external sponsorship. The 2018 Stockholm Agreement on Hodeidah entrenched Houthi de facto authority over the port, while the 2021 withdrawal of the Joint Forces on the Western Coast exposed failures in the anti-Houthi front. Restoring navigation security requires addressing root causes, not relying on aircraft carriers and naval task forces alone.
The crisis’s roots lie in Yemen’s post-2011 transition and the Houthi seizure of Sanaa in September 2014, which ended that transition and opened the way for a parallel armed authority controlling strategic territory, including approaches to Bab al-Mandeb and highlands overlooking the Red Sea. The Houthis also inherited residual capabilities of a state whose military was once ranked the fifth most heavily armed in the Arab world. The international community, now facing attacks on commercial vessels, did almost nothing to prevent Yemen’s disintegration, the article argues, and some actions even contributed to the Houthis’ takeover of Sanaa.
The article points to the 2018 Stockholm Agreement as a case in point: it secured a ceasefire, mutual redeployment and UN-supervised security and financial arrangements for Hodeidah, directing port revenues to the Central Bank rather than the Houthis. Yet the deal entrenched the Houthis as the de facto authority over the port and city and left the power imbalance tilted in their favour; it remains highly unpopular among anti-Houthi forces. In 2021, the Houthis solidified their grip on Hodeidah governorate after the unexplained withdrawal of the Joint Forces on the Western Coast; neither the Joint Forces nor the regional coalition supporting them notified the Yemeni government or the UN, and civilians were given only 24 hours’ notice. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen acknowledged the Stockholm Agreement’s failure, the article says, while the anti-Houthi front suffered from multiple military decision-making centres, inadequate coordination with the government and contradictions within the regional coalition. Instead of building a national army under the legitimate government through the defence ministry, the coalition allowed numerous local formations outside the state’s chain of command, reflected in Emirati backing for the separatist Southern Transitional Council and Saudi Arabia’s divergent priorities.
The outlook remains difficult: a long-term solution requires first recognising and then addressing the root causes of the Yemen crisis, including restoration of national institutions and a unified command structure under the legitimate government. Until then, temporary understandings and political pressure are unlikely to restore maritime security or prevent the Houthis from exploiting strategic territory and external sponsorship. The next phase will test whether international actors shift from containment and ad hoc deals to a coherent political and security strategy for Yemen and the Red Sea.
Source: www.aljazeera.com