Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), expressed confidence that the UN nuclear watchdog will conduct inspections of Iranian nuclear sites in the foreseeable future. Grossi told reporters on Wednesday that an interim deal between Iran and the United States provides for such inspections.

"Whether this happens the day after tomorrow or in one week or in 10 days, it's important, but not essential," Grossi said. "This is going to happen." However, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Kasem Gharibabadi countered that these issues "will be reviewed and decided only within the framework of a final agreement" and after progress on lifting sanctions against Tehran.

Iran's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva also stressed that Tehran has not yet agreed to the return of IAEA inspectors. The key question remains whether the new agreement can actually facilitate meaningful international oversight of Iran's nuclear program.

Experts say comprehensive inspections are technically possible. "Uranium enrichment takes place in large, conspicuous industrial plants," said Georg Steinhauser, a radiochemistry professor at the Vienna University of Technology. "So it's inconceivable that someone secretly builds an atomic bomb in a basement and only shows the inspectors the ground floor."

Politically, however, considerable obstacles remain. A law passed by the Iranian parliament significantly restricts cooperation with the IAEA. Hessam Habibi Doroh, a political scientist from the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management in Vienna, noted that "there are currently quite influential voices in parliament that speak out against comprehensive inspections."

The IAEA itself has lost access to key uranium enrichment facilities since last year's attacks on Iranian nuclear sites, according to a recent report. Surveillance is now primarily based on satellite imagery. The IAEA estimates Iran still has around 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to about 60%, which experts believe could be sufficient for several nuclear weapons after further enrichment to 90%.

For Steinhauser, the decisive question is access. "If this access is granted in full, then you can determine with great certainty whether a country is pursuing a civilian or a military nuclear program," he said. Habibi Doroh added that comprehensive inspections would require a verification regime similar to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but it is questionable whether Tehran's leadership would make such concessions today. Some political and security circles in Iran are now openly debating whether the country should expand its nuclear options.

Source: www.dw.com