In Europe, unlike in Asia, changes to decades-old international norms and institutional systems are often interpreted as a loss. However, these changes may also mark the beginning of a new, more inclusive order.
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the United States' disregard for the international order under President Donald Trump, and allegations that Israel violated humanitarian law in the Middle East conflict have shocked many Europeans. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated at the Munich Security Conference in February 2026: "This order, as imperfect as it was even in its best days, no longer exists in that form."
In Asia, political observers are often surprised at the consternation of some Europeans. Former Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan told DW: "Europe thought the jungle had been tamed for good. And then it got a shock." He added that competition and conflict are fundamental characteristics of international relations, and these harsh truths were obscured only for a brief period from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the global financial crisis.
Marc Saxer, Asia Pacific head of Germany's Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, told DW that European and Asian worldviews are shaped by different historical experiences. Under the protective umbrella of the United States, Europe was able to dream of a liberal world order. For Asia, that was unthinkable. Saxer considers efforts to maintain a liberal world order to have failed and believes that "a return by the US to the role it played until the 2010s is impossible for structural reasons."
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, director of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), told DW that the US under Trump is now attempting to "establish a hegemonic world of great powers, a kind of global directorate along with Russia and China," undermining international law and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. The result is a "wolf world," where the law of the strongest triumphs over the strength of the law.
Kleine-Brockhoff identifies three specific reactions: Japan, near a rising China, must deepen cooperation with the US; Europe focuses on strengthening itself economically and militarily; and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney articulated a counter-alliance of middle powers, stating: "The old order will not return. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy."
Saxer emphasizes that non-Western powers are now playing a decisive role in shaping the next world order. "What makes this historic turning point so special is that, for the first time in centuries, non-Western powers are playing a decisive role in shaping the next world order." Regulatory frameworks will need to consider both China's concept of order and the beliefs of the Muslim world.
Saxer advocates for "middle-power partnerships" rather than alliances, to prevent bloc formation. He proposes "transformative realism" as a way to integrate various visions of order, focusing on pragmatic cooperation based on shared interests while upholding non-negotiable principles like human rights.
Kleine-Brockhoff is skeptical about the stability of such an arrangement, arguing that "every system needs enforcement agencies and a minimum level of rules. The middle powers are too different and have too divergent interests." He fears an era of "endless free-riding," where individual actors seek their own advantage, making it harder to address global challenges like climate change and pandemics.
Source: www.dw.com