After months of war, pressure and diplomatic choreography, Lebanon has effectively entered into a declaration of intent with Israel. The reactions were swift: condemnation from wide swaths of Lebanon’s political actors, including Hezbollah and its allies, as well as protests in the streets and criticism in the media.
The problems with the signed document are many – it is unrealistic, politically explosive and constitutionally suspect. But perhaps the worst aspect of it is that it paves the way for a new war and for Lebanon to be blamed for it.
Israel has long understood the value of loosely worded interim arrangements, declarations and deferred questions. The Oslo agreement is titled Declarations of Principles and sets out “general guidelines for the negotiations to come”. Borders, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees, security and sovereignty were left for later; and “later” never came.
Lebanon is not Palestine, and neither the documents nor the contexts are identical. But the diplomatic logic is similar enough to be alarming: Lebanon and Israel declaring “their ambition to end conflict” while avoiding final answers may appear flexible, but in practice, it is most likely a trap.
The framework Lebanon has now accepted will be difficult, if not impossible, to implement as written, primarily because the Lebanese state cannot simply replace Hezbollah by decree. Hezbollah’s weapons are embedded in a political argument about deterrence, community protection and the state’s failure to defend its own territory.
Nor can the Lebanese army suddenly become the sovereign deterrent force while remaining underfunded, overburdened, politically compromised and dependent on external military assistance limited by Israeli and American red lines.
The most dangerous clauses are those that reach beyond the battlefield. Any language requiring the parties to cease “hostile” or “adverse” action in international political or legal forums should alarm ordinary Lebanese, victims of war crimes and defenders of international law.
There is also a deeper constitutional problem. Lebanon’s constitutional order does not give any one official the right to make such commitments alone. Treaties and international accords require institutional approval. Matters of war, peace and national security fall within the authority of the Council of Ministers.
Hezbollah and the Amal Movement have every incentive to push the declaration into Lebanon’s machinery of delay. They can argue that it requires cabinet approval, question whether it amounts to normalisation, demand clarity on Israeli withdrawal, and object to any clause limiting Lebanon’s right to pursue Israel legally.
The real agreement is not being decided in Beirut. It is being shaped through the wider regional track involving the United States, Iran and the mediators. The real deal is what Tehran instructs Hezbollah to do; what Washington is willing to guarantee; what Israel believes it can extract.
By signing a document in this fashion, hoping that over time it will be assigned to the dustbin of history, the heads of Lebanon’s government may believe they are buying time. But they are buying it with a document that can outlive the political moment that produced it.
The declaration does not prevent war. Instead it creates the legal and political language through which the next war will be justified. Lebanon is finally being invited to act as a state, but this exposes how little of that sovereignty currently exists.
Source: www.aljazeera.com